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Abstract
We study the evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria (NE) in a sym-
metric quantum game played by the recently proposed scheme of applying
‘identity’ and ‘Pauli spin flip’ operators on the initial state with classical
probabilities. We show that in this symmetric game dynamic stability of
a NE can be changed when the game changes its form, for example, from
classical to quantum. It happens even when the NE remains intact in
both forms.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper Eisert et al [1] have shown that when the players in a game
have access to quantum strategies the game can give different Nash Equilib-
ria (NE) that can give better payoffs. Marinatto and Weber[2] have proposed
another interesting scheme to play a quantum game where players implement
their ‘tactics’ on an initial strategy by a probabilistic choice between applying
the ‘identity’ and ‘Pauli spin-flip’ operators. In a quantized game there can rise
multiple NE similar to a classical game. For example classical version of the
Battle of Sexes game gives three NE and its quantization by Marinatto and We-
ber’s scheme again gives three NE. In classical game theory dynamical stability
is one of essential criteria to select among multiple NE that are solutions to a
game and it is usually considered with respect to some adjustment process that
underlies the game. Selten [3] introduced the idea of perturbations in normal
form classical games to get rid of unreasonable NE as solutions to these games by
using a static procedure based on intuitive equilibrium conditions of NE. Repli-
cator dynamic [11][13] in evolutionary game theory is an adjustment process for
which frequency of a particular strategy evolves according to its payoff relative
to that of other strategies. For pure available classical strategies S1, ..., Sn let
the proportion of players of Si at a particular time be pi, (i = 1, ..., n), so that
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the average population strategy is the vector p = (pi), with the expected payoff
of an Si player being fi(p) and the overall expected payoff in the population be-
ing F (p) =
∑
pifi(p). Then the replicator dynamic is defined by the differential
equation[14]
dpi
dt
= pi(fi(p)−F (p)) (1)
Thus the proportion of players which play the better strategies increase with
time. The replicator dynamic is originally based on biological considerations but
it has also found applications in Economics. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
(ESSs) of evolutionary game theory are attractors of replicator dynamic with
an important property of stability. When a population plays an ESS it cannot
be invaded by a small number of mutants.
Quantum games apart from finding applications in quantum information [4]
have also been considered interesting from another perspective. Referring to
Dawkins’ ’Selfish Gene’ [5] Eisert et al [1] hinted that games of survival are
being played already on molecular level where quantum mechanics dictates the
rules. Self replication of DNA molecules and synthesis of proteins which govern
all the processes of a living molecule are two essential ways [12] where quantum
information exchange can be said to play an important role. A consideration
of quantum games in such situations seems a good reason to make these games
interesting as indicated by Eisert et al [1]. A decision by a DNA molecule, for
example to replicate itself or to synthesize a protein, can be imagined as a set of
instructions that can formulated as a quantum strategy. How can, then, a DNA
molecule evolves and develops a procedure to prepare a particular protein, for
example, and not some other; assuming the procedure constitutes a quantum
strategy. Why the other strategies, leading to synthesis of a different protein for
example, instead of the desired one are not successful? This brings to mind the
notion of mutant strategy from ESS theory that tries to invade an ESS without
success and ESS comes out as a winning or successful strategy having a property
of stability against perturbations from mutants.
We assume life molecules in possession of many strategies out of which a few
or just one is successful in the sense of its increased use with time. The notion
of ESS derived from population biology problems but the concept remains valid
even when, for example, there are just two players to play a bi-matrix game.
In that case the ESS will be a strategy the players will choose to play almost
all the time and the fraction of the total time will replace the usual term called
‘frequency’ that corresponds to fraction of the total population. The molecule
deciding in favor of a particular set of steps out of many available options gave
us a good reason to consider perturbations in quantum game like situation
that we believe to exist in that domain of intermolecular interactions. Mutant
strategies constituting perturbations in classical evolutionary game theory are
not successful against the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) and ESS appears
as a stable strategy that cannot be invaded when mutants appear in small
numbers.
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Underlying process in the definition of ESS is replicator dynamic based on
Darwinian idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ leading to increase with time the
frequency of a strategy giving better pay off. Replicator dynamic is a simple and
theoretically attractive process that can have, we believe, an intuitive appeal
to be extended to quantum game like situations. Among the many possible
quantum strategies that we suppose to be at the disposal of a life molecule
the winning strategy, corresponding to synthesis of desired protein for example,
can be imagined as a result of micro-level replicator dynamic that becomes
responsible for the increased use of the winning stable strategy to such an extent
that the molecule implements it almost all the time and mutant set of procedures
resulting in undesirable synthesis cannot invade the stable solution called ESS
coming out of replicator dynamic.
In this perspective the use of replicator dynamic to select among many NE
a special one corresponding to a stable solution, in quantum game like situa-
tions that we believe to exist in molecules forming the basis of life, appears an
interesting hypothesis related to the mechanism existing in molecules to formu-
late and evolve established and stable procedures to perform their fundamental
functions. An adjustment process having fruitful results both in population
biology problems and economics is simple and intuitively appealing to form a
mechanism to provide stable solutions in the domain of molecular interactions.
We apply Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [2] to a symmetric game between
two players. Our reason to select this scheme is that the idea of a mixed NE
and mixed ESS can easily be given a meaning without some extra assumptions
when the pure strategies of the quantized version of the game are taken as
the implementation by the players of identity I and Pauli spin-flip operator
σx respectively. In Marinatto and Weber’s scheme quantum ‘tactics’ are applied
by selecting I and σx with classical probabilities similar to the case of mixed NE
in classical games where pure strategies are chosen with classical probabilities.
We then show how the ‘entanglement’ usually considered as a pure quantum
phenomenon can be exploited to select and decide ESSs in quantum version
of a game satisfying a few requirements. The game we consider is symmetric
similar to corresponding examples in evolutionary game theory where ESS is
usually defined for symmetric pairwise contests.
In an earlier letter [15] we showed that for certain asymmetric quantum
games between two players ESSs can be made to appear or disappear via a
control over the initial state even when the corresponding strategies remain NE
for those initial states. Our motivation in this letter is to explore similar possi-
bilities for symmetric quantum games. The ESS idea was originally defined for
symmetric games and will be of more interest when entanglement and entangled
states are exploited in those games as well. Even for possible molecular level
games referred to earlier the symmetric contests seems more appropriate and
interesting. It also brings the exciting subject of mathematical theory of ESSs
in the domain of quantum games and also quantum mechanics in general. Dur-
ing the last thirty years the theory of ESSs has been developed by collaboration
between mathematicians and evolutionary biologists. An extension of the ESS
idea in quantum games is an opportunity for both quantum game theory and
3
classical theory of ESSs to broaden their domains and also look for topics of
common interest.
2 Evolutionary Stability
An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) was originally defined by Smith and
Price [6] with the motivation that a population playing the ESS can withstand a
small invading group. They considered a symmetric game where the players are
anonymous. Let P [x, y] be the payoff to a player playing x against the player
playing y.Strategy x is an ESS if for any alternative strategy y, the following
two requirements are satisfied:
P [x, x] ≥ P [y, x] (2)
and in the case were condition 2 is satisfied as an equality:
P [x, y] > P [y, y] (3)
Requirement 2 is in fact the Nash requirement and requires that no single
individual can gain by unilaterally changing strategy from x to y. For a linear
structure of the game the two requirements 2 and 3 are equivalent to that for
any y 6= x there is a critical positive value such that if the frequency of the
y-mutant strategists is lower than this value (while the rest of the population
sticks to the strategy x), it is better for everyone to stick to majority strategy x,
better being defined in terms of individual maximization of the payoff function
P [7][8].Thus, as ESS is a strategy which, if played by almost all members
of a population, cannot be displaced by a small invading group playing any
alternative strategy. An ESS will persist as the dominant strategy through
time, so that strategies observed in the real world will tend to be ESSs [9].ESS
comes out dynamically stable with respect to replicator dynamic. In molecular
level situations when replicator dynamic is taken as the underlying process the
ESSs involving quantum strategies will similarly tend to be observed in real
micro world.
3 Evolutionary stability in symmetric quantum
games
In Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [2] an entangled ‘initial strategy’ is forwarded
to two players on which they apply their ‘tactics’. To remain consistent with
available literature on the theory of ESSs in classical games we preferred to
call Marinatto and Weber’s ‘initial strategy’ an ‘initial state’ and call their
‘tactics’ as ‘strategies’. This change in terminology has no effect on the originally
proposed scheme to play a quantum game [10]. We consider following symmetric
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bi-matrix game between two players for two available classical strategies S1 and
S2
(
(α, α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (σ, σ)
)
(4)
with the constants of the matrix α, β, γ, σ satisfying the following conditions.
α, β, γ, σ ≥ 0
(σ − β) > 0
(γ − α) ≥ 0
(γ − α) < (σ − β) (5)
We take the initial quantum state to play the above game to be[2]:
|ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉 (6)
where
|a|
2
+ |b|
2
= 1 (7)
The associated density matrix is[2]:
ρini = |a|
2 |S1S1〉 〈S1S1|+ ab
⋆ |S1S1〉 〈S2S2|
+a⋆b |S2S2〉 〈S1S1|+ |b|
2
|S2S2〉 〈S2S2| (8)
Where p and q be the probabilities of two players to act with the operator
∧
I. Payoff to a p player against a q player for the payoff matrix (4) are written
as [2]:
P (p, q) = α
{
pq |a|
2
+ (1 − p)(1− q) |b|
2
}
+
β
{
p(1− q) |a|
2
+ q(1− p) |b|
2
}
+
γ
{
p(1− q) |b|
2
+ q(1− p) |a|
2
}
+
σ
{
pq |b|2 + (1− p)(1 − q) |a|2
}
(9)
The condition that makes (p⋆, p⋆) a NE is given as:
P (p⋆, p⋆)− P (p, p⋆)
= (p⋆ − p)
[
− |a|
2
(σ − β) + |b|
2
(γ − α) + p⋆ {(σ − β)− (γ − α)}
]
≥ 0
(10)
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From the relation (10) it is clear that there can be three NE i.e. the pure
strategies p⋆ = 0, p⋆ = 1 and the mixed strategy p⋆ = (σ−β)|a|
2−(γ−α)|b|2
(σ−β)−(γ−α) . In the
earlier form of this letter we only considered the strategy p⋆ = 0 and showed that
it is evolutionary stable in the classical game (4) with conditions (5) but not so
in a quantum version of the same game. We are grateful to anonymous referee
who hinted the need to study the problem in a more general and systematic way.
We now consider the evolutionary stability of these three NE of the symmetric
game (4) in three separate cases:
3.1 Case p⋆ = 0
For the strategy p⋆ = 0 to be a NE we should have:
P (0, 0)− P (p, 0) =
p
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
[
|a|2 −
(γ − α)
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
]
≥ 0 (11)
Now [P (0, 0) − P (p, 0)] > 0 when 1 ≥ |a|2 > (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β) and p
⋆ = 0 is a
pure ESS. However, at |a|
2
= (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β) we have the difference (11) zero and
p⋆ = 0 can be an ESS if
P (0, p)− P (p, p)
= p {(γ − α) + (σ − β)}
{
|a|2 −
(1− p)(γ − α) + p(σ − β)
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
}
> 0 (12)
it can be written as:
P (0, p)− P (p, p) = p {(γ − α) + (σ − β)}
{
|a|
2
−̥
}
> 0 (13)
Where (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β) ≤ ̥ ≤
(σ−β)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) for the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. In such
a situation p⋆ = 0 can be an ESS only when |a|
2
>
(σ−β)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) which is not
possible because |a|2 is fixed at (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β) . Therefore p
⋆ = 0 is a stable NE or
an ESS for 1 ≥ |a|
2
>
(γ−α)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) and at |a|
2
= (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β) this NE becomes
unstable. The classical game is obtained by fixing |a|2 = 1 for which p⋆ = 0 is
a stable NE. However, this NE does no remain stable when |a|2 = (γ−α)(γ−α)+(σ−β)
corresponding to an entangled initial state; though, the NE remains intact in
both forms of the game.
3.2 Case p⋆ = 1
Similar to previous case we write the NE condition for the strategy p⋆ = 1 as:
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P (1, 1)− P (p, 1) =
(1 − p)
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
[
− |a|
2
+
(σ − β)
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
]
≥ 0 (14)
Now p⋆ = 1 is a pure ESS for 0 ≤ |a|
2
<
(σ−β)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) . At |a|
2
= (σ−β)(γ−α)+(σ−β)
we have the difference given in eq. (14) zero. The strategy p⋆ = 1, then, becomes
an ESS when
P (1, p)− P (p, p)
= (1 − p) {(γ − α) + (σ − β)}
{
− |a|2 +
(1− p)(γ − α) + p(σ − β)
(γ − α) + (σ − β)
}
> 0
(15)
It is possible only when |a|
2
<
(γ−α)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) . Therefore the strategy p
⋆ = 1
is a stable NE for 0 ≤ |a|
2
<
(σ−β)
(γ−α)+(σ−β) . Therefore, the strategy p
⋆ = 1 not
stable classically ,i.e. for |a|
2
= 1, can be stable for an entangled initial state.
3.3 Case p⋆ =
(σ−β)|a|2−(γ−α)|b|2
(σ−β)−(γ−α)
In case of the mixed strategy
p⋆ =
(σ − β) |a|
2
− (γ − α) |b|
2
(σ − β)− (γ − α)
(16)
we have from the NE condition (10)
P (p⋆, p⋆)− P (p, p⋆) = 0 (17)
The mixed strategy (16) becomes an ESS when
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p)
= (p⋆ − p)
[
− |a|2 (σ − β) + |b|2 (γ − α) + p {(σ − β)− (γ − α)}
]
> 0(18)
for all p 6= p⋆. Write now the strategy p as p = p⋆ + △. For the mixed
strategy of eq. (16) the payoff difference of the eq. (18) can be reduced to:
P (p⋆, p)− P (p, p) = −△2 {(σ − β)− (γ − α)} (19)
So that, for the game defined in the conditions (5) the mixed strategy p⋆ =
(σ−β)|a|2−(γ−α)|b|2
(σ−β)−(γ−α) cannot be an ESS, though it can be a NE of the symmetric
game.
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4 Conclusion
Dynamic stability is a well known refinement concept in situations where mul-
tiple NE arise as solutions to a symmetric quantum game played between two
players. ESS is a stable NE in a game when its dynamics puts a direct pro-
portionality between frequency of a strategy and its relative payoff advantage
usually termed as replicator dynamic. We suggested that this idea can be in-
teresting not only in population biology but also in quantum game theory. We
explored evolutionary stability of NE in a symmetric quantum game played be-
tween two players via a scheme proposed recently by Marinatto and Weber [2].
We showed that in this scheme the evolutionary stability of a pure strategy for a
symmetric game can be changed by maneuvering the initial state even when the
strategy remains a NE during such a maneuver. For example, in a symmetric
game a pure strategy can be an ESS in the classical form of the game but it does
not remain so in some quantized form of the same game. We also showed that in
the proposed scheme [2] with its particular form of initial state the evolutionary
stability of a mixed strategy, however, cannot be changed while retaining the
corresponding NE. Our results show that entangled states have also potential
roles to play in the stability properties of NE in symmetric games. It shows the
possibility of achieving dynamic stability of NE in symmetric quantum games
via the use of entangled states.
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